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Through Bankruptcy with the Creditors'
Bargain Heuristic
Robert E. Scottt
Cases, Problems, and Materials on Bankruptcy. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD &
THOMAS H. JACKSON. Little, Brown & Company, Boston, Mass., 1985.
Pp. xxix, 1049. $31.00.
It is a commonplace, but nonetheless true: the study of bank-
ruptcy has attained a new respectability in American law schools.
After years of modest enrollments and few genuine scholarly con-
tributions, bankruptcy courses are now fully subscribed and many
young academics are turning their attention to the technical com-
plexities and conceptual underpinnings of modern bankruptcy law.
A number of factors contribute to this new-found glamour. Most
obviously, the enactment of the new Bankruptcy Code has fueled
scholarly interest in reporting its modifications and changes and in
exploring its theoretical unity. Simultaneously, there has been in-
creasing resort to the bankruptcy process to resolve vexing con-
flicts between the societal interest in reducing the costs of business
failure and the allegedly overriding interests in preserving collec-
tive bargaining agreements,1 compensating victims of defective
t Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Virginia. I would like to thank
Michael Dooley and Paul Stephan for helpful comments. I am also indebted to Erin Keller-
man (J.D. 1986) for her research assistance in the preparation of this essay. Ms. Kellerman
contributed in important ways to the discussion of risk sharing and general average in Part
II.
, Section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982) [hereinafter cited
without cross-reference], permits a trustee to reject, with the bankruptcy court's approval,
the executory contracts of the debtor business. A bankruptcy procedure that permits the
unilateral termination of a collective bargaining agreement permits an employer to do what
otherwise would be a serious unfair labor practice under § 8(d) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). Nevertheless, the courts have uniformly treated labor
agreements as executory contracts and held that the agreements could be rejected in a
Chapter 11 reorganization proceeding. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513,
522 n.6 (1984); In re Brada Miller Freight Sys., 702 F.2d 890, 894 (11th Cir. 1983); Local
Joint Executive Bd. v. Hotel Circle, Inc., 613 F.2d 210, 212-14 (9th Cir. 1980); Brotherhood
of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks v. REA Express, 523 F.2d 164, 168-69 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1017 (1975), and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976); Shopmen's Local Union No.
455 v. Kevin Steel Prod., 519 F.2d 698, 706 (2d Cir. 1975). The Bankruptcy Amendments of
1984 added section 1113 to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113 (West Supp. 1986),
which requires the debtor to make a proposal to the union regarding modifications to the
collective bargaining agreement before seeking rejection of the agreement. The bankruptcy
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products,2 and insuring the removal of toxic waste and other envi-
ronmental hazards.3 Finally, and most significant, the bankruptcy
process vividly illustrates the tensions between the various max-
imization and distributional norms that underlie modern theories
of legal regulation.4
Many scholars have contributed to the renewed academic in-
terest in bankruptcy. 5 Among them, Douglas Baird and Thomas
court can approve the rejection of the agreement only if the debtor makes the required
proposal, the union refuses to accept the proposal "without good cause," and "the balance of
the equities clearly favors rejection" of the agreement. See generally Note, Rejection of
Collective Bargaining Agreements Under the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984, 71 VA. L.
REv. 983 (1985) (arguing that a bankruptcy court should require a showing of necessity
before permitting rejection of a collective bargaining agreement).
' A.H. Robins Co. and Johns-Manville Corp. have filed bankruptcy petitions to reduce
their liability for product liability claims. When A.H. Robins filed for reorganization, the
company faced roughly 12,000 product liability claims asserted by women who had used the
Dalkon Shield birth control device. See Robins Runs for Shelter, TsE, Sept. 2, 1985, at 32.
When Johns-Manville filed its Chapter 11 petition, 16,500 claimants had suits pending
against the company alleging exposure to asbestos. One source predicted that the number of
asbestos suits might reach 52,000. See Manville's Bold Maneuver, TnE, Sept. 6, 1982, at 17.
In addition to Johns Manville, two other manufacturers of asbestos, Amatex Corp. and
Unarco Industries, have filed bankruptcy petitions. See In Re Amatex Corp., 30 Bankr. 309
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983); In re UNL Indus., 29 Bankr. 741 (N.D. I. 1983), appeal dismissed,
725 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1984). For a representative sampling of the scholarly debate sur-
rounding such petitions, see Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. Rev. 846 (1984);
Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and
the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 689 (1985); Note, Mass Tort Claims and
the Corporate Tortfeasor: Bankruptcy Reorganization and Legislative Compensation Ver-
sus the Common-Law Tort System, 61 TEx. L. REv. 279 (1983).
3 In response to the increasing costs of cleaning up hazardous waste, several disposal
companies have filed for bankruptcy protection. See, e.g., Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New
Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755 (1986); Ohio v. Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. 705
(1985); Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984); In
re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc., 11 COLLIER BANKR. CAs. 2D (MB) 1246 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1985). For a representative sampling of the scholarly debate, see Baird & Jackson, Kovacs
and Toxic Wastes in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1199 (1984); Hennigan, Accommodating
Regulatory Enforcement and Bankruptcy Protection, 59 AM. BANKe L.J. 1 (1985); Hoffman,
Environmental Protection and Bankruptcy Rehabilitation: Toward a Better Compromise,
11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 671 (1984); Rosenbaum, Bankruptcy and Environmental Regulation: An
Emerging Conflict, 13 ENvTL. L. REP. (ENvTm. L. INST.) 10,099 (1983).
4 While variously described, the major challenge for legal regulation is to harmonize
the societal interest in having both guns and butter-that is, pursuing wealth maximization
as well as distributional objectives.
While asking forgiveness for errors of omission, any list of seminal scholarship should
include (in addition to the work of Baird and Jackson): Clark, The Duties of the Corporate
Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARv. L. Rev. 505 (1977); Coogan, Confirmation of a Plan Under
the Bankruptcy Code, 32 CAse W. Res. L. REv. 301 (1982); Countryman, Executory Con-
tracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REv. 439 (1973); Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in
Perspective, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 953 (1981); LoPucki, A General Theory of the Dynamics of
the State Remedies/Bankruptcy System, 1982 Wis. L. Rev. 311; McCoid, Bankruptcy, Pref-
erences, and Efficiency: An Expression of Doubt, 67 VA. L. Rev. 249 (1981); Roe, Bank-
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Jackson are the two legal academics most closely identified with
efforts to reconceptualize modern bankruptcy law. In a series of
articles, some authored jointly,6 others individually, they have set
the terms of the scholarly debate for the next decade. The center-
piece of that scholarship is the creditors' bargain heuristic. Using
the model of a hypothetical creditors' bargain, Baird and Jackson
have demonstrated that the parties affected by a potential bank-
ruptcy procedure would agree in advance to a collectivization pro-
cess in order to maximize the total pool of assets and to resolve
vexing prisoner's dilemma problems. The cornerstone of this the-
ory is the normative claim that pre-bankruptcy entitlements
should be impaired in bankruptcy only when necessary to maxi-
mize net asset distributions to the creditors as a group, and never
to accomplish purely distributional goals."
The creditors' bargain conception is a powerful heuristic, one
which illuminates much of the logic of bankruptcy. Nonetheless, it
is only partially successful in rationalizing current bankruptcy law.
Indeed, Baird and Jackson have isolated numerous instances where
current features of the bankruptcy process violate this maximiza-
tion norm.9 My purpose in this essay is not to offer a scholarly
ruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 527
(1983); Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 846 (1984); Schwartz, Products
Liability, Corporate Structures and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk
Relationship, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 689 (1985); Shuchman, An Attempt at a "Philosophy of
Bankruptcy," 21 UCLA L. Rxv. 403 (1973).
6 Baird & Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Owner-
ship Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51
U. CHL L. REv. 97 (1984); Baird & Jackson, Kovacs and Toxic Wastes in Bankruptcy, 36
STAN. L. REv. 1119 (1984); Baird & Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper
Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829 (1985).
Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127
(1986); Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the au-
thor); THOMAS JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMrrs OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (forthcoming 1986);
Jackson, Translating Assets and Liabilities to the Bankruptcy Forum, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 73
(1985); Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REv. 725 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as Avoiding Powers]; Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements and the
Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Creditors' Bargain].
8 See Avoiding Powers, supra note 7, at 727-31; Creditors' Bargain, supra note 7, at
868-71.
* Jackson discusses a number of instances in which bankruptcy law "systematically ig-
nores" the creditors' bargain vision. For instance, courts exhibit a tendency to grant less
than adequate protection to secured parties' claims in reorganization proceedings. See Cred-
itors' Bargain, supra note 7, at 872-77. Similarly, bankruptcy law grants the debtor and the
bankruptcy trustee broad freedom to choose a non-acceleration-based compensation stan-
dard for both lenders and executory contract holders. Id. at 879-91. Even more striking
deviations from the creditors' bargain model are found in section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code, and in the doctrine of Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931) (allowing trustee to avoid
entirely interests a subrogated creditor could have avoided only to the amount of his claim).
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assessment of the creditors' bargain conception or to attempt to
harmonize the maximization norm with the persistent redistribu-
tional tendencies of bankruptcy law.10 Rather, I mean to focus
solely on the pedagogic utility of such a unified conceptual theme
as it is embodied in the Baird and Jackson casebook, Cases,
Problems, and Materials on Bankruptcy.11
Reviewing casebooks is a low-ceiling endeavor. In part, my
willingness to undertake such a thankless task was fueled by self-
interest. Having also authored a casebook with a strong conceptual
focus, 12 I was eager to assess the merits of teaching materials that
project a single vision. At the outset I should dispose quickly of
some basic pedagogic concerns. The substantial strengths of the
Baird and Jackson book derive from an inspired organizational
structure and equally flawless selection of the principal cases that,
in sequence, expose the basic themes underlying the bankruptcy
process. Unfortunately, this analytic and thematic clarity is eroded
by the authors' aversion to the declarative sentence 3 and the
proliferation of conceptually simplistic and distracting problems.
Having paid homage to the reviewer's traditional role, how-
ever, I intend to focus in this essay on only one feature of the
Baird and Jackson book: its single-minded pursuit of the creditors'
bargain vision. My thesis can be simply stated: a conceptual heu-
ristic-such as the creditors' bargain-is an optimal method for
analyzing a complex subject for two apparently contradictory rea-
sons. First, the creditors' bargain heuristic has great explanatory
Jackson observes that from the perspective of a creditors' bargain model, "the Bankruptcy
Code's embodiment in section 544(b) of the holding... of Moore v. Bay is unfortunate
[and] the general thrust of section 544(b) is unprincipled." Avoiding Powers, supra note 7,
at 749-50.
10 I have suggested elsewhere that a relational theory of secured financing-one that
reconceptualizes security as a means of effecting socially beneficial pre-bankruptcy control
over the business venture-relieves much of the apparent incompatibility between the max-
imization and distributional norms. See Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing,
86 COLUh. L. REv. (forthcoming 1986) [hereinafter cited as A Relational Theory]. Indeed,
the creditors' bargain heuristic is not necessarily inconsistent with a bankruptcy process
that embraces both risk sharing and purely distributional features. See Scott, Bankruptcy
Sharing Rules and Pre-Bankruptcy Entitlements, 72 VA. L. REv. (forthcoming 1986).
11 D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTcY (1985).
12 A. ScHwARTz & R. SCOTT, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
(1982).
13 Baird and Jackson's tendency to string together series of puzzling and frequently
rhetorical questions often seems a parody of the classical Socratic style that the intellectual
aspirations of the book so clearly reject. For an extreme illustration of this phenomenon, see
the "Problem" on page 87 which contains 13 consecutive Socratic questions. Perhaps the
authors are eager to package their work as a "traditional" casebook. In any event, this seem-
ingly minor flaw leads to student reactions far more critical than the materials warrant.
1986]
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power, thus revealing the hidden themes in a system of seemingly
diverse legal rules. Second, as with any heuristic, it suffers from
significant distortions and limitations, and in the process of appre-
ciating those limitations the subtleties of the legal terrain can be
better understood.
I develop this thesis in Part I of the essay. A review of the
basic creditors' bargain theme illustrates its extraordinary power
as a method of understanding and justifying prominent features of
bankruptcy law. Part II introduces an alternative heuristic which
can be seen as either a complementary or a competing vision. This
vision highlights the limits of any single heuristic and demon-
strates the value of a richer conception of the bankruptcy process.
Yet, such additional themes can be introduced successfully only if
the student previously has been grounded in bankruptcy theory.
Thus, I conclude that the Baird and Jackson conceptual frame-
work is a significant advance in the teaching of the bankruptcy law
even for those who do not share their unqualified commitment to
the creditors' bargain heuristic.
I.
The central premise underlying the creditors' bargain vision is
that bankruptcy is a foreseeable risk that can be (and is) borne
individually by the various claimants of any business enterprise,
including secured and unsecured creditors, shareholders, and man-
agers. The calculation of this risk thus influences individual credi-
tors' decisions as to whether security should be taken and on what
terms. The assumption that the risk of bankruptcy is allocated
among individual claimants through mutually beneficial executory
contracts suggests that the Bankruptcy Code should respect pre-
bankruptcy entitlements as recognized under state law. Secured
creditors, for example, "paid" for these entitlements by accepting a
lower rate of return, and should thus retain the benefits of the ini-
tial bargain by receiving an equivalent value for their collateral in
bankruptcy. Unsecured creditors obtain a higher interest rate by
forgoing security, but in so doing assume a greater risk that their
claims will not be fully satisfied upon default and subsequent
bankruptcy. State law recognizes this relationship by giving se-
cured creditors with perfected claims priority over unsecured cred-
itors.14 Therefore, the Bankruptcy Code should also honor this re-
lationship by maintaining secured creditors' state law entitlements
14 See U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(a) (1977).
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and preventing redistribution from secured creditors to unsecured
creditors and the debtor.15
This basic argument is supported by several further observa-
tions. First, the recognition of a different method of distributing
entitlements in bankruptcy will necessarily create perverse incen-
tives that motivate parties to use the bankruptcy process strategi-
cally. Unsecured creditors and debtors will opt for bankruptcy
when their share of the bankruptcy estate exceeds the value of
their entitlements under state law. Secured creditors, on the other
hand, will prefer state law if deprived of state law entitlements in
bankruptcy. The parties will maneuver strategically to obtain the
most favorable outcome, thus generating unnecessary social costs.
The effects of these perverse incentives are enhanced because par-
ties bargain in the shadow of both state and bankruptcy law and
can exploit provisions unfavorable to the opposing side as a means
of obtaining a favorable readjustment of the bargained-for entitle-
ment. Uniformity between state and bankruptcy law alleviates
these problems.18
The second justification for the preservation of pre-bank-
ruptcy entitlements in bankruptcy is that secured creditors would
otherwise be unwilling to join in a bankruptcy process from which
they derive no personal advantage. Yet, the mandatory inclusion of
secured creditors is necessary for unsecured creditors to enjoy the
fruits of collective action. Bankruptcy provides creditors with a
collective forum which solves a classic prisoner's dilemma prob-
lem17 and provides an increased pool of assets for distribution to
unsecured creditors generally. Thus, for example, the bankruptcy
16 For a more detailed summary of the creditors' bargain conception, see generally
Note, The Proper Discount Rate Under the Chapter 11 Cram Down Provision: Should Se-
cured Creditors Retain Their State Law Entitlements or Should These Entitlements Be
Redistributed to Unsecured Creditors and the Debtor?, 72 VA. L. RE V. (forthcoming 1986).
16 Id.
1 To illustrate how the prisoner's dilemma applies to an insolvent debtor, assume that
no collective proceeding exists by which creditors can collect their claims. When creditors
sense that the debtor is having financial difficulty, they will all attempt to collect their
claims immediately. The reason is simple: those who delay risk non-recovery of their debts
if other creditors grab first and exhaust the available pool of assets. However, if the going-
concern value of the firm exceeds its liquidation value (a likely assumption when assets are
sold piecemeal), the creditors as a group stand to gain by forgoing collection of their individ-
ual claims to enhance the pro rata recovery of all creditors collectively. Unfortunately, ab-
sent a collective procedure, the creditors of an insolvent debtor are too numerous and too
diverse to reach the optimal result through private bargains. This, then, is a classic pris-
oner's dilemma situation in which rational individual behavior leads to inferior results be-
cause parties are unable to reach mutually beneficial bargains. See A. SCHWARTz & R. Scorr,
supra note 12, at 806-07.
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trustee may invalidate certain pre-bankruptcy transfers through
the power to avoid preferences. This and other avoidance powers
serve to protect the collective process by invalidating individual
collection efforts undertaken shortly before bankruptcy. Further-
more, Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a procedure
in which a debtor may continue in business when the firm's going-
concern value exceeds its liquidation value. This Chapter provides
unsecured creditors with the enhanced value that results from a
"sale" of the business to its former owners. Such an increase in net
asset value would occur whenever the existing owners of the firm
are better able to assess the firm's going-concern value than are
third party buyers in a liquidation sale. 18 In sum, substantial in-
creases in total creditor wealth are available through the collective
process of bankruptcy. But these gains can be realized fully only if
the secured creditors are made at least indifferent as between state
law and bankruptcy law.
Armed with this clear and coherent vision, the student of
bankruptcy can develop a conceptual understanding of the bank-
ruptcy process that yields a deeper appreciation of its nuances-an
understanding that cannot be achieved by the most careful reading
and re-reading of the statutory provisions and explanatory com-
mentary. More importantly, the maximization norm permits one to
predict important features of the bankruptcy process. Thus, for ex-
ample, Baird and Jackson begin their book with the question: who
may properly be a debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding? 19 It be-
comes obvious to the student that this question is an exercise in
drafting rules to prevent the strategic use of the bankruptcy pro-
cess. Because the creditors' bargain conception is not perfectly rep-
licated in the bankruptcy process, there are opportunities for par-
ties to attempt to employ bankruptcy for ends other than those
directed by the maximization norm. The statutory provisions pre-
scribing the number and requisite characteristics of creditors enti-
tled to file involuntary petitions, 0 the types of claims they must
hold,21 and the discretionary authority given to the bankruptcy
court to dismiss petitions under section 305 are all screening de-
vices designed .to filter out strategic manipulations of the bank-
ruptcy process.
Once a bankruptcy petition is properly filed, the creditors'
See D. BAniD & T. JACKSON, supra note 11, at 601-08.
1' See id. at 47-122.
20 See Bankruptcy Code § 303.
21 Id.
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bargain heuristic illuminates the central process of bankruptcy: the
identification of the eligible claimants and the estate to be distrib-
uted.22 Indeed, from the perspective of bankruptcy as a maximiza-
tion process for creditors, this procedure would be extraordinarily
simple were it not for the problem of time. Baird and Jackson ex-
plore the various dimensions of the inter-temporal problems that
generate a much more complicated bankruptcy process. The first
temporal problem arises because insolvency (and any resulting
bankruptcy) does not occur instantly. Thus, some parties are able
to anticipate its onset and to grab the assets necessary to satisfy
fully their individual claims in violation of the maximization norm.
The trustee's avoidance powers, especially the preference power in
section 547, are mechanisms for reaching back in time to preclude
individual advantage-taking just prior to the filing of a bankruptcy
petition.23
The second temporal problem raises a parallel concern. Insol-
vency and bankruptcy proceedings do not begin instantly, and they
do not end instantly either. Therefore, the legal rulemaker faces
the vexing problem of collectivizing the estate for distribution to
claimants holding pre-bankruptcy entitlements, while at the same
time permitting the debtor-in-possession or bankruptcy trustee to
deal with post-bankruptcy relationships as though no insolvency
proceedings were underway.24 Separating these two purposes is the
basic goal of section 362 and the automatic stay. Thus, for exam-
ple, section 362(a) identifies those events that can be characterized
as violations of the maximization norm by pre-bankruptcy credi-
tors. On the other hand, section 362(b) is designed to insure that
attempts to resolve the prisoner's dilemma do not impair the
debtor's relationship with post-bankruptcy claimants who should
be unaffected by the bankruptcy process.25
By focusing on the bankruptcy process as a sorting out of as-
sets and liabilities over time, Baird and Jackson are able to point
with increased clarity to some of the anomalies of bankruptcy law,
such as the treatment of executory contracts under section 365.26
The creditors' bargain conception suggests that the Bankruptcy
Code's treatment of executory contracts, especially the right of the
22 See D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, supra note 11, at 123-217. Baird and Jackson are in fact
quite skeptical of the need for Chapter 11 proceedings. See infra text accompanying notes
28-31.
'8 See BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 11, at 219-359.
" Id. at 361-546.
,1 Id. at 362-64.
26 Id. at 451-521.
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trustee to assume defaulted contracts, represents a violation of the
premises underlying the maximization norm.
Once temporal problems are resolved, the liquidation proce-
dure in bankruptcy follows as a relatively straightforward exercise
in distributing the remaining assets among the various claimants.28
The most interesting implications of the creditors' bargain heuris-
tic, however, are raised by Chapter 11 and the reorganization pro-
cedure. A creditors' bargain perspective challenges the traditional
justification for a Chapter 11 proceeding since a Chapter 7 liquida-
tion can include (in addition to piecemeal transfers) the sale of the
business to a third-party buyer as a going concern. 29 The principal
justification for a reorganization procedure that is consistent with
the maximation norm thus must rest on the assumption that third-
party buyers cannot readily value certain firms because of the
unique contribution of specialized actors such as the owner-man-
ager and relational financers. If such valuation problems are acute,
then a reorganization procedure in which the firm is, in essence,
sold to the original claimants through a restructuring would en-
hance total creditor wealth. But this defense of reorganization as a
wealth-maximizing process rests on problematic empirical assump-
tions.30 To the contrary, much of the Chapter 11 procedure seems
designed to effect redistributional rather than maximization
goals.31
217 See Bankruptcy Code § 365(a), (b)(1), (e). The Code's invalidation of ipso facto
clauses in bankruptcy under § 365(e) causes holders of executory contracts (and lessors) to
be treated differently from other lenders who are permitted to accelerate their debts upon
default. Thus, the executory contract holder is denied access to the market to value its
accrued rights. Since, absent bankruptcy, one who breaches a contract forfeits all accrued
rights in the executory contract, section 365 is denying these claimants a pre-bankruptcy
entitlement.
" See D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, supra note 11, at 547-600.
29 Id. at 601-08.
20 In order to increase total creditor wealth through a Chapter 11 reorganization there
must be: a nontrivial number of enterprises wherein various claimants have made invest-
ments in the firm that are difficult to value; the gains in asset value resulting from a reor-
ganization must exceed the costs (including the distributional costs) of the reorganization
procedure; the net gains to such "value-impacted" firms must exceed the net costs that
reorganization imposes on those firms for which a third-party sale would realize a larger
aggregate asset pool.
31 The redistributional effects of Chapter 11 are largely indirect. They provide leverage
to unsecured creditors and residual claimants in the plan negotiation process. Thus, for ex-
ample, section 1121 grants the debtor, for 120 (plus 60) days, the exclusive right to propose
a reorganization plan. Studies on agenda influence confirm the key leverage this provides
the debtor (and existing management) in negotiations over restructuring the firm. See Le-
vine & Plott, Agenda Influence and Its Implications, 63 VA. L. REv. 561 (1977). In addition,
section 1124(2) permits a plan to cure and compensate a holder of a claim in which the
debtor has previously defaulted, and thus treats the claim as unimpaired for purposes of
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It is, then, in the context of Chapter 11 that the student must
confront the limitations of the creditors' bargain heuristic. Baird
and Jackson's exposition to this point is such a powerful demon-
stration of the effectiveness of the maximization norm that one is
led inevitably to search for alternative or complementary themes
that might successfully rationalize these "anomalous" aspects of
federal bankruptcy. Given the force of the creditors' bargain argu-
ment, how can we explain the persistence of redistributional im-
pulses in bankruptcy? One obvious answer is that the bankruptcy
process reflects a genuine tension between the maximization objec-
tive and a competing distributional norm: that all participants
should share (at least in part) in the unanticipated or "common"
risks of business failure. Under this conception, bankruptcy shar-
ing can be seen as a response to an unanticipated common disaster
for creditors, much like a hurricane or an earthquake.32 This com-
peting vision-that bankruptcy embraces risk-sharing solutions for
certain unanticipated risks-provides a useful counterpoint with
which students can explore both the strengths and limitations of
the creditors' bargain heuristic."s
It is tempting to suggest that teachers who wish to enrich the
basic creditors' bargain conception will be overwhelmed by the
power of the Baird-Jackson theme as it progresses inextricably
through the casebook. My experience, however, is that the authors'
success in presenting a unified and coherent vision of bankruptcy
frees the instructor to offer speculative and provocative alternative
explanations for features of the bankruptcy process that do not fit
the Baird-Jackson vision. In Part II of this essay, I hope to illus-
securing plan approval. This denies to such claimants the current market value of their
claim, thus impairing the pre-bankruptcy entitlement. Finally, the inherent ambiguity (and
resulting discretion) of efforts to fix the firm's value permits courts to approve reorganiza-
tion plans that, in fact, deny certain claimants the full value of their pre-bankruptcy entitle-
ments. The many problems that prevent an "accurate" valuation of a reorganized firm are
discussed in A. SCHWARTZ & R. SCOTT, supra note 12, at 806-09.
32 See A Relational Theory, supra note 10; see also PETER COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY, IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND BANKRUPTCY, 1607-1900, at
13 (1974) (colonial bankruptcy rules justified as a form of risk-spreading compulsory
insurance).
33 Bankruptcy law has never purported to grant absolute recognition to pre-bankrupcy
entitlements. The stated policy of the federal courts interpreting bankruptcy law has been
to accord substantial respect to state-created rights unless they conflict with federal policy
and equitable principles. See Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S.
156, 161-63 (1946); REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. I, at 78 (1973) ("For the most part [prior
claims] should be recognized in the bankruptcy process.") (emphasis added) [hereinafter
cited as COMMISSION REPORT].
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trate that point by turning to a tentative elaboration of a common
disaster model as an alternative (or complementary) theme that
enriches the maximization norm.
II.
The creditors' bargain model does little to explain the risk-
sharing aspects of the federal Bankruptcy Code. In particular, the
rules governing the adequate protection of secured creditors, 4 the
treatment of executory contracts,3 5 the trustee's avoidance pow-
ers,36 and most especially the reorganization procedures in Chapter
11, 7 do not fit easily into this model. Either these Code provisions
are arbitrary (or misguided), or there is some other notion motivat-
ing these bankruptcy rules. An analogy to the law of admiralty, in
particular the law of general average, may provide insights into an
underlying risk-sharing theme in bankruptcy law.
The notion of general average is part of the admiralty rules of
all maritime nations, and its antecedents can be traced to Roman
law.38 The basic principle underlying general averaging is that if a
ship loaded with precious cargo should founder at sea, the captain
may take whatever steps are necessary to prevent the ship and
cargo from sinking altogether. All owners involved in the sail will
contribute to the general average expense according to their per-
centage of ownership.
There are several theoretical bases for a general average rule.
One justification, for example, might rely on a hypothetical bargain
analysis. If at the time of contracting for the shipping of goods all
34 Bankruptcy Code § 361. Exactly what constitutes adequate protection is unclear.
Section 361's definition includes a replacement lien, periodic cash payments, or the "indubi-
table equivalent" of the secured creditors' interest in the property. Pre-Bankruptcy Code
case law strongly suggests that valuation problems will frequently result in protection that is
less than completely compensatory. See, e.g., In re Bermec Corp., 445 F.2d 367 (2d Cir.
1971); In re Yale Express Sys., 384 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1967); see also A. SCHWARTZ & R.
SCOTT, supra note 12, at 806-10.
35 See supra note 27.
36 See supra note 9. In addition to 544(b), section 544 (a)(3), the so called "bona fide
purchaser" test of avoidability, gives the trustee power to invalidate security interests in
realty that no unsecured creditor could avoid outside of bankruptcy.
37 See supra note 31; see also infra text accompanying notes 47-51.
38 See G. GiLmORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 244 (2d ed. 1975). Gilmore &
Black trace the earliest recorded evidence of general averaging to the Digest of Justinian:
"[I]f merchandise is thrown overboard to lighten the ship, the loss occasioned for the benefit
of all must be made good by the contribution of all." DIG. JUST. 14.2.1 (Monro trans. 1909);
see also J. DONALDSON, C. STAUGHTON & D. WILSON, LOWNDES & RUDOLF'S THE LAW OF GEN-
ERAL AVERAGE AND THE YORK-ANTWERP RULES 3-4 (British Shipping Laws vol. 7, 10th ed.
1975) (tracing the practice of general average back to pre-classical times).
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interested parties were required to bargain over the optimal re-
sponses to perils at sea, they would collectively agree that the cap-
tain should have the authority to make necessary sacrifices of the
cargo or the vessel and that all parties should bear the losses pro
rata. In essence, at the moment danger becomes imminent, each
participant in the voyage would consent to a sacrifice of some of
his property rights in order to preserve the remainder, and further-
more, all other parties would agree to effect a ratable compensa-
tion to the losers out of the property that is left.
Agency theory offers a complementary rationale to explain
why parties would agree ex ante to this unusual form of risk shar-
ing. Under agency principles, the captain is the agent of all of the
principals participating in the venture. When a perilous situation
arises, it is in the interests of all participants that when the cap-
tain responds, he takes all interests equally into account; that is,
that he effects whatever sacrifice is necessary to promote the joint
interests of all participants in the voyage.3 9 One method of approx-
imating the cooperative result is to encourage the captain to act as
if there were only one owner in the enterprise. If the ownership
interests were "integrated," it would not matter whose property
was sacrificed because all of the participants would bear the loss as
joint venturers.
Under agency theory, therefore, the purpose of general average
rules is to dissipate the captain's conflict between self-interest and
duty at the moment of sacrifice. At that critical time, the captain
must decide if he should jettison the cargo or cut off the mast. But,
absent a sharing rule, a bias invades the captain's judgment. The
captain has an interest in preserving the ship for the benefit of the
owner, his employer. Moreover, any adversely affected cargo own-
ers will predictably claim that the captain overlooked a less costly
method of sacrifice if the captain has jettisoned their property.
Thus, the captain also is motivated to minimize any subsequent
claims that his judgments were flawed. To be sure, a critic of gen-
3' The joint-cost-minimization solution (or mitigation principle) is the most likely out-
come of a hypothetical bargain between contracting parties charged explicitly with designing
a policy to cope with uncertain future conditions. See Goetz & Scott, The Mitigation Prin-
ciple: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligations, 69 VA. L. REv. 967, 972-73
(1983). I have suggested elsewhere that the conditions for such relational contracting arise
whenever the parties are incapable of reducing important terms of the arrangement to well-
defined obligations. Such definitive obligations may be impracticable because of either the
uncertainty of future contingencies or the complexity of any required responses. See Goetz
& Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089, 1090-95 (1981). In such
relational environments, all parties will benefit if they agree in advance to rules-such as
general average-that will reduce expected future costs.
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eral average might maintain that since merchants and shipowners
can obtain insurance, the captain's bias is irrelevant. The insur-
ance payout should have the same effect as general averaging with-
out the unnecessary complication and friction. But third-party in-
surance suffers from a moral hazard that will unnecessarily
increase the premium costs. If the captain's conflicting interests
are sufficiently strong at the moment of crisis, he will make jettison
decisions that are inconsistent with the joint interests of the par-
ties. Hence, the general average calculation is the optimal form of
insurance because it encourages the captain to make the most effi-
cient jettison possible.40
It is this same kind of self-interest bias that bankruptcy law
seeks to avoid. When it appears that a business is about to
founder, creditors attempt to "grab" the available assets for their
individual benefit to the detriment of the group as a whole. This
behavior creates the familiar prisoner's dilemma, similar to the di-
lemma faced by the captain of a ship when peril approaches. In the
bankruptcy analogue to general average, a dominant secured credi-
tor-such as a general financing bank-is equivalent to the ship's
captain struggling in high seas.
Other events on the "eve of bankruptcy" appear to parallel
events on the "eve of general average sacrifice" as well. Examining
the elements at risk on any nautical voyage, the requirements of
general average allowance and the mechanics of the general aver-
age computation can best illuminate this similarity. Three things
are at risk on a nautical voyage. First, the ship belonging to its
owner is at risk. Second, the cargo or goods on board belonging to
merchants are at risk. Third, the freight-the compensation the
captain receives for the safe passage of the goods to their final des-
tination-is at risk. Similarly, three things are at risk on a business
"voyage." Just as shipowners provide the vehicle necessary for the
nautical venture, so too do the owners of a company provide a cor-
porate shell, complete with state licenses, assets, and goodwill as a
vehicle for the venture. Just as merchants load their cargo on a
ship in one port expecting to gain a profit on their wares at an-
other port, so too do creditors "load" their credit onto a company
expecting a higher rate of return. And just as the captain of a ship
40 This argument is merely a variant on the theme that liquidated damage and penalty
clauses permit contracting parties to insure more efficiently against the difficulty in valuing
losses associated with contract breach. See Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties
and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a The-
ory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 554, 578-83 (1977).
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expects a freight payment for the safe passage of goods from port
to port, so too do secured creditors expect compensation for the
monitoring and other financial services they provide the corporate
venture.41
In short, the corporate shell is like a ship in that both are
worth the present capitalized value of all future earnings less work-
ing expenses. Creditors are equivalent to the cargo on a ship in
that they extend credit to this particular venture in anticipation of
an optimal return on their investment. Secured creditors represent
the captain of the ship; they expect a premium in return for effec-
tively monitoring the debtor's business decisions and for providing
other financial services associated with the monitoring function.
This premium is similar to the captain's freight payment upon
reaching the final destination with ship and cargo intact.
Not all losses will trigger a risk-sharing response, however.
Before any of the affected interests has a right to general average
contribution, three requirements must be met.42 First, there must
be a common danger that is inevitable except by voluntarily incur-
ring the loss of a portion of a whole to save the rest. Second, in an
attempt to avoid the peril, part of the joint concern must be jet-
tisoned. Third, the attempt to avoid the common peril must be
successful.
Analogous events may occur in bankruptcy. The imminent
threat of a business failure owing to unanticipated contingencies is
a "common danger" that under many conditions will inevitably oc-
cur unless creditors agree to sacrifice a portion of their claim in
order to save the enterprise. To be sure, the normal risks of busi-
ness failure, just as the normal risks of a maritime adventure, are
not common risks, and the interest that sustains the loss must bear
it alone.43 Risk-sharing contribution requires both an unantici-
41 In addition to monitoring efforts, there is substantial evidence that secured creditors
provide their debtors with valuable financial inputs, especially financial coordination and
experienced financial management. See A Relational Theory, supra note 10.
42 See Barnard v. Adams, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 270, 303 (1850); G. GLMoRE & C. BLACK,
supra note 38, at 245.
43 There is no right of general average contribution in the ordinary case of loss through
marine mishap. See G. GILMoRE & C. BLACK, supra note 38, at 246. Thus, by analogy, the
impulse to risk sharing must derive not from insolvency that results from foreseeable con-
tingencies, but rather from unanticipated or "common" perils. See, e.g., Columbian Ins. Co.
v. Ashby & Stribling, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 331, 338 (1839); J. DONALDSON, C. STAUGHTON & D.
WmLsoN, supra note 38, 37, at 19 (York-Antwerp Rule A (1974): "There is a General Aver-
age act when, and only when, any extraordinary sacrifice or expenditure is intentionally and
reasonably made or incurred for the common safety for the purpose of preserving from peril
the property involved in a common maritime adventure.").
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pated peril and the sacrifice of individual rights in order to reha-
bilitate the enterprise. Thus, risk sharing in bankruptcy is justified
only where unsecured creditors or residual claimants "jettison"
some or all of their claims against the debtor in order to avoid the
common danger through reorganization. The general creditors'
agreement to sacrifice some of their entitlements improves the
prospects for a successful reorganization and increases the value of
the enterprise whenever going-concern value exceeds the value of a
piecemeal liquidation. Perhaps, therefore, a case for general aver-
age contribution exists in bankruptcy as well as admiralty.
The mechanics of the general average apportionment insure
that all interested parties will share equally in the loss. The value
of each contributing interest is multiplied by a fraction, the nu-
merator of which is the sum of the general average expense, and
the denominator of which is the sum of the contributing values."
For example, assume the following facts:45 the ship is valued at
$1000. The captain jettisons a mast worth $5. Cargo is worth
$1000, of which $100 worth is jettisoned. The value of the freight
(the anticipated compensation for safe carriage) is $100 and $10 is
lost. Thus, the sum of the contributing values is $1000 + $1000 +
$100 or $2100. The sum of the general average expense is $5 +
$100 + $10 or $115. The ship must assume $1000 x $115/$2100 or
about $55 of the burden. The cargo must also contribute about $55
($1000 x $115/$2100). The freight owes $100 x $115/$2100 or $5.
Since the ship bore less than its fair share of the loss (in jettison-
ing the mast worth only $5), it must pay the difference between its
actual loss and its fair share to the cargo and freight. ($100 cargo
jettisoned - $55 cargo's share = $45 to the cargo; $10 freight lost
- $5 freight's share = $5 to the freight). In this scheme no one is
made whole; all suffer equally.
Applying general average in admiralty is much like applying
the equality norm in bankruptcy.46 While equity dictates that
losses should be borne equally in bankruptcy, the problem is de-
ciding which parties are equal. If general average contribution were
employed, the claimants would be required to share an amount
equal to the value of each creditor's interest multiplied by the total
4 See, e.g., Pacific Freighters Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 109 F.2d 310, 312
(9th Cir. 1940).
45 The example is derived from G. GmMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 38, at 247.
46 A major goal of the Bankruptcy Code is to ensure equal treatment of all creditors.
See 3 J. MooRa & L. KING, COLLEPR ON BANKRuprcy, 60.01, at 743 (14th ed. 1977); CoMMIs-
SION REPORT, supra note 33, pt. I, at 76-79.
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loss over the total amount contributed to the venture. For in-
stance, assume the general and secured creditors loan the venture
$1000. Assume further that an unpredictable technological change
results in substantial business losses, and only $800 is left to pay
the creditors. (Thus, total creditor losses are $200.) The secured
creditors contribute an additional $500 that includes "freight"
charges for monitoring services and financial advice. (Thus, total
contributions to the venture are $1500.) In return for these services
the secured creditors are promised a priority position, thus they
initially suffer no losses.
According to general average principles, when a common dan-
ger (unforeseeable insolvency) is imminent, these losses should be
shared among the claimants in proportion to their contributions to
the venture, if by doing so the peril (liquidation) can be avoided.
Under such a regime, if reorganization is successful, the general
creditors should suffer only $133 in loss ($1000 x $200/$1500). The
secured creditors, while permitted additional "freight" compensa-
tion for insuring business success ("safe passage") with the availa-
ble credit ("goods intact"), must forfeit some of their compensa-
tion because the venture failed (some of the cargo was lost at sea).
The secured creditors should forfeit $67 of their secured interest
($500 x $200/$1500). This $67 will go to augment the estate for the
benefit of the unsecured creditors (compensation for the cargo
owners). Thus, the secured creditors, while entitled to both "cargo"
and "freight" values, forfeit a little of each. They will still come
out better than the unsecured creditor who is entitled only to
"cargo" values.
This risk-sharing model may help explain what is at work in
certain sections of the Bankruptcy Code. For example, the pres-
sures toward bankruptcy sharing are most frequently manifested
in bankruptcy reorganizations where security interests in specific
assets are converted into deferred cash payments. The key to the
conversion process is the choice of an appropriate discount rate.
Courts animated by a maximization norm will adopt a discount
rate that is similar to the current market rate of interest-the rate
such creditors would receive under state law.' On the other hand,
"' Assuming the presence of an acceleration clause, secured creditors are entitled to the
entire outstanding principal upon default. This amount, paid either in cash or in kind by
seizure of the collateral, can then be reinvested at the current market rate of interest. See,
e.g., Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Whitman, 692 F.2d 427, 429 (6th Cir. 1982); In re Sco-
vill, 18 Bankr. 633, 634 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1981) (adopting a discount rate based on the cur-
rent market rate of interest for similar loans in the region); cf. In re Landmark at Plaza
Park Ltd., 7 Bankr. 653, 656-68 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1980) (rejecting reorganization plan with
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courts animated by risk-sharing notions will adopt a variety of
rates that vary from the current market rate for similar loans. It is
clear that many courts consider redistribution from secured credi-
tors to unsecured creditors and debtors appropriate. Thus, for in-
stance, one commonly adopted rate is the rate owed by delinquent
taxpayers. This rate is the average predominant prime rate quoted
by commercial banks to large businesses.48 In the words of one
court, such a rate is "reasonably responsive to current economic
conditions, is subject to periodic revisions, yet is not an unfair
burden. . on debtors.' 49
Other instances of risk-sharing can be found in some of the
specific rules of the Bankruptcy Code. For example, a secured
creditor is not impaired under section 1124(2) if the debtor cures a
previous default and reinstates the contract rate of interest despite
the presence of an acceleration clause. The norm underlying this
provision is made clear by a Senate report on section 1124(2):
The intervention of bankruptcy and the defaults represent a
temporary crisis which the plan of the reorganization is in-
tended to clear away. The holder of a claim or interest who
under the plan is restored to his original position, when others
receive less or get nothing at all, is fortunate indeed and has
no cause to complain.50
In sum, bankruptcy has never purported to grant absolute recogni-
tion to pre-bankruptcy entitlements. The stated policy of the fed-
eral courts interpreting bankruptcy law has been to accord sub-
stantial respect to state-created rights unless in conflict with
federal policy and equitable principles. 1
The preceding sketch of a common disaster theme is conced-
edly (even determinedly) provocative and speculative. My purpose
here is merely to suggest that a conceptual approach to teaching
legal topics does not impair the search for richer and more varied
explanations of the underlying behavior that is being regulated. In-
below market rate repayment plan). See generally A Relational Theory, supra note 10;
Note, supra note 15.
48 See, e.g., In re Caudle, 13 Bankr. 29, 37-38 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1981); In re Ziegler,
6 Bankr. 3, 6 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980). Other courts have awarded the coupon yield rate of
one-year treasury bills. See, e.g., In re Connecticut Aerosols, Inc., 42 Bankr. 706, 710-11 (D.
Conn. 1984); In re Fisher, 29 Bankr. 542, 549-50 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983).
9 In re Ziegler, 6 Bankr. 3, 6 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980) (emphasis added).
80 S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 120, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5787, 5906.
81 See Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 161-63 (1946);
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 33, pt. I, at 78.
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deed, to the contrary. The maximization norm is obviously a domi-
nant theme in bankruptcy. Its power is only enhanced by the rec-
ognition that other norms may also be influencing bankruptcy law,
all of which must be explored before one can fully understand the
texture (and tensions) of the bankruptcy process.
CONCLUSION
A conflict between the maximization of insolvent debtors' as-
sets and distributional equality among claimants appears to ani-
mate bankruptcy law. Competing metaphors for the bankruptcy
process that underlie each of these norms may rationalize some (or
all) of this tension. The creditors' bargain vision so ably elucidated
by the work of Baird and Jackson justifies the maximization norm
by imagining an ex ante agreement among claimants that is repro-
duced in bankruptcy. The Baird and Jackson bankruptcy casebook
provides a unified conception of this heuristic, enabling a student
to develop a sophisticated understanding of the logic of the bank-
ruptcy process. This understanding is not impaired by the fact
that the creditors' bargain conception, like all heuristics, is subject
to bias. The teachers using these materials must suggest alterna-
tive visions that may correct for some of this bias. Thus, for exam-
ple, a common disaster heuristic-drawing perhaps on the analogy
to general average contribution-explains the distributional norm
by casting certain kinds of business failure as unanticipated calam-
ities befalling claimants. According to this common disaster heuris-
tic, bankruptcy has a risk-sharing function that may complement
its asset-maximizing function.2
To be sure, the union of individual and common risks is not
unproblematic. Quite possibly, the cost of accommodating both vi-
sions-especially the invitation for individual debtors and credi-
tors to manipulate the bankruptcy process for strategic pur-
poses-exceeds any corresponding social benefits. Furthermore,
bankruptcy sharing rules may help existing victims at the expense
of future participants. Any redistributional effects of bankruptcy
reduce the relative attractiveness of security to creditors and thus
52 As the common disaster heuristic sketched above suggests, there is no necessary in-
compatibility between rules for asset maximization and rules for risk sharing. Risk sharing
for uncertain and unforeseeable risks is a maximizing strategy for risk-averse bargainers.
Sharing under such conditions reduces the dead-weight costs of uncertainty. Thus a risk-
sharing scheme for certain common disasters would predictably be negotiated in the credi-
tors' bargain whenever individual risk bearing is unlikely to produce net gains in risk
avoidance.
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reduce the price differential between secured and unsecured credit.
Sharing assets with unsecured creditors and residual claimants
thus may impose costs on potentially insolvent debtors who would
otherwise benefit from a wider variance in the price of secured and
unsecured credit. Nevertheless, a common disaster vision may be a
useful way to understand the redistributional impulses that are
unambiguously present in various provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code and the decided cases.
